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CNRP Cambodia National Rescue Party
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FUNCINPEC Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, 
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III. About the Country Insights Lab Series 
The Institute for Societal Leadership conducted a series of eleven Country Insights 
Labs (CILs) in select Southeast Asian cities between June 2014 and June 2015. 
Each CIL aimed to uncover the critical social and environmental issues facing 
leaders from business, government and civil society in a given country and frame 
the underlying causes behind each issue within the country’s context. The study 
identified emerging trends in Southeast Asia and has since directed further re-
search toward interconnected social and environmental issues shared among 
countries in the region. 
Additionally, ISL research staff investigated the day-to-day organisational chal-
lenges faced by social impact organisations (SIOs) in each Southeast Asian coun-
try. We broadly defined an SIO as any organisation with the capacity to contribute 
to the betterment of communities. These included, but were not limited to, phil-
anthropic organisations, corporate foundations, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), activist groups, social enterprises and impact investors. Interviews fo-
cussed on challenges associated with funding models, human resources, tax in-
centives, legal frameworks and government registration processes. In total, re-
search staff interviewed 237 organisations and 293 individuals, including govern-
ment officials, business leaders, philanthropists, NGO workers, social entrepre-
neurs, media professionals and academics. The interviews themselves consisted of 
questions relating to organisational history, operations, strategic outlook, cross-
sector collaboration, leadership and country context.  1
The Institute did not intend the CIL series to be exhaustive or to produce statisti-
cally significant data. On the contrary, the series was a qualitative study that em-
ployed interviews and market insights as a means of understanding an increasing-
ly complex landscape. As one of the world’s most diverse regions, Southeast Asia 
is home to an array of cultures, languages, religions and economic levels of devel-
opment. At the cornerstone of each country study is a belief that workable solu-
tions and partnerships depend on an awareness of how each country’s unique 
context relates to its social issues.
The ISL research team conducted interviews in Phnom Penh between 17–19 Au-
gust 2014. 
 
 For a list of sample questions, see section VI. 1
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IV. Cambodia 
A. Historical Background  
Once a relatively sleepy agrarian kingdom, Cam-
bodia has experienced some of the most horrific 
violence since the close of the Second World War. 
Between 1970 and 1999, the country was the vic-
tim of both a brutal civil war as well wider regional 
conflicts. The Khmer Rouge seizure of power in 
1975 brought four years of forced collectivisation 
and mass killings that have haunted the Cambo-
dian psyche ever since.  The decade of Viet2 -
namese occupation that followed only further 
exacerbated the country’s massive humanitarian 
problems. When the United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) exited after elec-
tions in 1993, it left behind a country with less-
than-stable political institutions, an unresolved 
history of mass violence and a chronic depen-
dence on large infusions of foreign aid. 
Although Prince Norodom Sihanouk presided 
over a period of economic prosperity after Cam-
bodia shed its status as a French protectorate in 
1953, his policies of “extreme neutrality” increas-
ingly alienated erstwhile allies while creating 
room for an insurgency at home. Sihanouk’s unre-
lenting suppression of leftwing newspapers and 
his police force’s antidemocratic crackdowns in 
the Cambodian countryside radicalised many of 
Phnom Penh’s French-educated elite and sent 
them into the jungle, where the future leaders of 
the Khmer Rouge made contact with the Viet Minh 
and Pathet Lao. At the same time, the prince failed 
to steer his country clear of the Second Indochina 
War being waged next door in Vietnam and Laos. 
His 1963 rejection of U.S. military aid and subse-
quent alliances with Maoist China and North Viet-
nam spurred the rightwing elements in the royal-
ist government to stage a military coup and es-
tablish a U.S.-friendly Khmer Republic under Mar-
shal Lon Nol in 1970. 
Most readers are familiar with the horrors perpe-
trated by the Khmer Rouge. After seizing control 
of Phnom Penh from Lon Nol's government in 
1975, Pol Pot’s regime systematically killed ap-
proximately 1.7 million people, or 21 percent of 
the country’s population.  The Khmer Rouge also 3
dismantled the country's largely-agrarian econo-
my, leading to widespread famine and shortages. 
Revolutionary fighters herded the entire popula-
tion of Phnom Penh into the countryside, where 
they were organised into labour camps and 
forced to work 12-hour days. Teachers, business-
people and other educated professionals were 
often executed on the spot. 
The Vietnamese army dislodged the Khmer 
Rouge from Phnom Penh at the start of 1979, but 
U.S. and Chinese opposition to the Vietnamese 
precluded badly-needed international aid from 
entering Cambodia throughout the 1980s. The 
Cambodian-Vietnamese conflict precipitated an 
international refugee crisis as Cambodians fled in 
droves to the Thai border. Fighting dragged on, 
with the Vietnamese-backed State of Cambodia 
(SOC) arrayed against the remnants of the Khmer 
Rouge, the republican Khmer People’s National 
Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the royalist Front uni 
national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, 
pacifique et coopératif (FUNCINPEC). Cambodia's 
situation demanded outside help, but Cold War 
geopolitics prevented the international communi-
ty from reaching a viable solution until the Viet-
namese, facing shrinking Soviet aid and a collaps-
ing economy at home, withdrew in 1989. 
UNTAC, the brainchild of the 1991 Paris Peace 
Accords, was the largest international peacebuild-
ing endeavour to-date, but it only achieved limit-
ed results. The UN poured more than US$1.6 bil-
lion into Cambodia with the goal of disarming 
rebel groups and engineering fair elections in 
1993. UNTAC personnel included nearly 16,000 
international soldiers, 3,500 police, 6,000 in-
 For a thorough overview of the origin, crimes and aftermath of Khmer Rouge rule, see Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was Over: Cambo2 -
dia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution (New York: Public Affairs, 1998).
 ‘Cambodian Genocide Project,’ accessed 22 October 2014, http://www.yale.edu/cgp/.3
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ternational professionals and 400 UN volunteers. 
The operation also recruited 2,500 interpreters, 
4,000 electoral officers and 50,000 polling staff 
within Cambodia.  Although UNTAC was success4 -
ful in repatriating the over 370,000 refugees who 
had been living in camps on the Thai border for 
well over a decade, it failed to demobilise the two 
largest military forces in the country.  Up to, dur5 -
ing and after the May 1993 elections, SOC and 
Khmer Rouge soldiers continued to wage civil war 
against each other. 
The elections were themselves overwhelmingly 
successful, but did not lead to a lasting Cambodi-
an democracy. FUNCINPEC candidate Prince 
Norodom Ranariddh was declared the winner 
with 45 percent of the vote, but incumbent Prime 
Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s 
Party (CPP) refused to cede power, leading to a 
joint government with the two men sharing the 
prime ministership.  In 1997, after fighting broke 6
out between the two factions, Hun Sen seized 
power from Prince Ranariddh with the backing of 
 Jeni Whalan, ‘Evaluating Peace Operations: The Case of Cambodia’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 16 (2012), 228–29.4
 Ibid., 247.5
 Ibid., 239.6
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Cambodia By Numbers 
Official Name:    Kingdom of Cambodia (1993–present)                         
Capital:      Phnom Penh                                      
Area:     183,035 sq km                                          
Population:    15.46 million (country); 1.55 million (Phnom Penh)                                
Ethnic Groups:    Khmer (90%), Vietnamese (5%) Chinese (1%),                          
     Other (4%)                                                     
Religion:    Buddhist (96.9%), Muslim (1.9%), Christian (0.4%)                                     
     Other (0.8%)                                                      
Language:   Khmer (official), but minority ethnic groups speak                                  
     their own languages                                                    
  
Currency:    Cambodian Riel                                   
GDP (PPP):   US$39.63 billion [2013 est.]                                            
GDP Per Capita (PPP): US$2,600 [2013 est.; 2nd lowest in Southeast Asia]               
GDP Real Growth Rate: 7% [2013 est.]            
Labour Force:   Agriculture (55.8%), Industry (16.9%),                            
     Services (27.3%)                                                    
Literacy:    73.9% (whole); 82.8% (male); 65.9% (female)                                     
Life Expectancy:  63.78 years (whole); 61.35 years (male); 66.32 years                         
     (female) [2014 est., 2nd lowest in Southeast Asia]                                                    
Source: CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) 
the military and re-instituted CPP hegemony, 
which has lasted to this day. 
B. Current Challenges 
 
❖ Persistent poverty in rural districts. Cambodia’s 
economy at large has posted average growth as 
compared to other ASEAN countries, but declin-
ing human development indicators and persistent 
rural poverty still remain an unfortunate reality for 
millions of Cambodians. Between 1993 and 2010, 
per capita GDP more than doubled, but poverty 
rates continued to hover around 30 percent in 
2007.  Cambodia’s infant and child mortality rates 7
are currently the highest in the region. In 1990, 8 
percent of infants died in their first year. By 2001, 
that number had increased to 9.7 percent. Child 
mortality under five also climbed steadily from 
11.5 percent in 1990 to 14 percent in 2001.  8
Although the tourism and garment industries 
have generated recent economic growth in urban 
areas, particularly Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 
rural Cambodians are still overwhelmingly poor 
and lack access to alternative sources of income. 
The Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey estimates 
that as many as 34 percent of rural Cambodians 
live below the poverty line. Rural Cambodians 
have significantly lower life expectancies and 
higher infant and maternal mortality rates than 
those residing in Phnom Penh.   9
Rural communities are largely poor because they 
lack access to roads, markets and irrigation sys-
tems. A weak education system in the countryside 
also leaves rural Cambodians with little to no al-
ternatives to agricultural work. With an estimated 
three-fifths of the Cambodian labour force en-
gaged in farming activities, an oversupply of agri-
cultural workers keeps wages at rock bottom.  10
❖ An absence of rule of law fuelling inequitable 
and unsustainable growth. Cambodia’s economy 
has consistently grown by seven percent annually 
in the last decade, but inability to hold companies 
and government officials accountable has pre-
vented the country from achieving equitable and 
sustainable growth. Increased Chinese demand 
for agricultural products such as rubber has re-
sulted in skyrocketing property prices in key rural 
areas, providing incentive for unscrupulous gov-
ernment officials to sell off tracts of land to for-
eign conglomerates. In spite of a government 
moratorium on Economic Land Concessions 
(ELCs) to agricultural conglomerates, local offi-
cials continue to appropriate land, at times vio-
lently, from residents. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s 
burgeoning textile industry, buoyed by increased 
demand from Western countries, has failed to 
keep up with international labour standards. 
Swedish clothing manufacturer H&M recently 
disclosed that one-third of its Cambodian suppli-
ers had strikes or mass-fainting incidents on-site. 
Textiles workers are paid low wages, work long 
hours and are often the target of police intimida-
tion.  11
A number of hydropower and logging projects 
also threaten to do irreversible damage to Cam-
bodia’s native ecosystems. With the backing of 
Chinese provider Sinopower, the Cambodian 
government plans to build a network of 17 hy-
dropower dams that will provide power to several 
countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion. 
Keeping in mind that Cambodia is in dire need of 
infrastructure improvements, these hydropower 
projects nonetheless threaten to displace tens of 
thousands of people and destroy the forests upon 
which they draw their livelihoods. Finally, illegal 
clearing, at the hands of both large agricultural 
conglomerates and poor rural families, threatens 
to destroy Cambodia’s approximately 10 million 
 Jeni Whalan, ‘Evaluating Peace Operations: The Case of Cambodia’, 244.7
 Sophal Ear, ‘The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia’, Asian Journal of Political Science 15.1 (April 2007), 76.8
 Anders Engvall et al., ‘Poverty in Rural Cambodia: The Differentiated Impact of Linkages, Inputs, and Access to Land’, Asian Economic Pa9 -
pers 7.2 (May 2008), 78–79.
 Anders Engvall et al., ‘‘Poverty in Rural Cambodia’, 76.10
 Khatharya Um, ‘Cambodia in 2013: The Winds of Change’, Southeast Asian Affairs (2014), 104–10711
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hectares of forest. Cambodia lost 22 percent of its 
forest cover between 1973 and 2009.  12
❖ The UNTAC legacy and a continued perception 
of Cambodia as a charity case. UNTAC’s presence 
in Cambodia between 1992 and 1993 brought a 
modicum of stability to the country, but the coun-
try has been largely dependent on regular infu-
sions of foreign aid to run day-to-day operations 
ever since. Between 1993 and 2003, Cambodia 
received US$5 billion in Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) from foreign governments, 
amounting to 13% of GDP annually. In 2007, for-
eign aid made up half the national budget.  13
Cambodia is one of the few countries in the world 
where the nonprofit sector threatens to outcom-
pete the private and public sectors. The relatively 
high salaries offered by foreign NGOs draw the 
nation’s talented young graduates into the non-
profit field at the expense of local business and 
government. Meanwhile, government officials are 
paid low salaries, fuelling corruption and ineffi-
ciencies. NGOs have become a fixture in both 
Phnom Penh and the countryside, running educa-
tional, health, social and infrastructure services 
that would ordinarily be the purview of the gov-
ernment. With business development sparse at 
present, it seems unlikely that Cambodia can tran-
sition to self-sufficiency in the near future.  
International focus on certain causes célèbres, 
especially sex trafficking and orphans, has divert-
ed crucially needed resources and attention away 
from addressing the root causes of Cambodia’s 
myriad social and environmental problems. In 
recent years, foreign tourists visiting Cambodia 
have increasingly volunteered at one of the hun-
dreds of orphanages dotting the country. Accord-
ing to UNICEF, only 23 percent of children in 
these orphanages have no living parents. Some 
Cambodian orphanage owners are exploiting 
children from poor families to reap large sums 
from foreign tourists.   14
The September 2014 closure of the international-
ly-acclaimed Somaly Mam Foundation also 
brought to light several issues surrounding the 
country’s extensive network of anti-trafficking or-
ganisations and NGO practices in general. A 
Newsweek article by Simon Marks printed five 
months prior to the closure presented evidence 
that activist Somaly Mam had fabricated her own 
story of forced prostitution as well as the stories 
of several alleged victims.  Advocacy and lobby15 -
ing efforts by foreign and local anti-trafficking 
NGOs resulted in legislation that conflates sex 
work with sex trafficking, leaving Cambodian sex 
workers open to abuse by police.  These same 16
organisations have routinely produced numbers 
without clear origins in order to drum up overseas 
donations. Independent analysis in 2008 by statis-
tician Thomas Steinfatt placed the number of po-
tentially trafficked sex workers in Cambodia at 
only 1,058, or four percent of the 27,925 sex 
workers in the country.  Meanwhile, the aggres17 -
sive and unethical practices of a select few NGOs 
threaten to discredit the entire sector. 
❖ Stalled elections and protests. The July 2013 
national elections were marred by intimidation of 
opposition candidates, suppression of indepen-
dent media and alleged fraud on the part of the 
ruling CPP. Over 1.2 million voters from traditional 
opposition strongholds were reportedly missing 
from voter registration lists, and the government 
issued an estimated 500,000 temporary identity 
certificates that could potentially have been used 
to shore up its own weaknesses where necessary. 
 Ecosystems in the Greater Mekong: Past trends, current status, possible futures (Gland, Switzerland: WWF - World Wildlife Fund for Nature, 12
2013), accessed 22 October 2014, http://cambodia.panda.org/news_cambodia/publications/?208456/Ecosystems-in-the-Greater-Mekong-
past-trends-current-status-possible-futures.
 Sophal Ear, ‘The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia’, 74.13
 Residential Care in Cambodia (New York: UNICEF, 2011), accessed 22 October 2014, http://www.unicef.org/cambodia/Fact_sheet_-_resi14 -
dential_care_Cambodia.pdf.
 Simon Marks, ‘Somaly Mam: The Holy Saint (and Sinner) of Sex Trafficking’, Newsweek, 21 May 2014, accessed 22 October 2014, http://15
www.newsweek.com/2014/05/30/somaly-mam-holy-saint-and-sinner-sex-trafficking-251642.html.
 Chenda Keo, ‘Human Trafficking and Moral Panic in Cambodia’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 16
(2014), 204
 Thomas M. Steinfatt, ‘Sex trafficking in Cambodia: fabricated numbers versus empirical evidence’, Crime, Law and Social Change 56 17
(2011), 458.
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The opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party 
(CNRP), in spite of winning an unprecedented 55 
seats in the National Assembly, boycotted the 
results while demanding that the government 
dismantle the National Election Commission 
(NEC). NEC members had been appointed by the 
CPP-backed Ministry of the Interior.  18
The ensuing CNRP protests have resulted in a 
number of violent government crackdowns. On 
15, 20 and 22 September 2013, government se-
curity forces broke up protestors using live am-
munition, killing one activist and injuring at least 
44 others. On 12 November 2013, police shot 
and killed one protestor and wounded nine oth-
ers at a pro-opposition workers’ strike.  19
❖ Delays and political complications with the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The Khmer Rouge Tri-
bunal, officially the Extraordinary Chambers of the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), was established in 
2006 with UN assistance in order to provide a 
measure of justice and reconciliation for the vic-
tims of the Khmer Rouge, but it has experienced a 
number of delays as well as political interference 
from the ruling CPP. The court has a mandate to 
prosecute senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge and 
those most responsible for crimes committed 
between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979. 
Khmer Rouge leaders stand accused of torture, 
murder, religious persecution, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, destruction of cultural 
property and crimes against internationally pro-
tected people under the 1961 Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations. 
The tribunal has already produced guilty verdicts 
regarding Kaing Guek Eav, who was responsible 
for the deaths of 12,000 inmates at S-21 prison, 
Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan.  However, it 20
has also has come under heavy criticism from 
both the international community and the Cam-
bodian opposition. Prime Minister Hun Sen has 
obstructed the tribunal from raising any addition-
al cases, arguing that prosecution against mid-
level Khmer Rouge commanders could lead to 
renewed civil war. Several CPP officials, including 
Prime Minister Hun Sen himself, were mid-level 
officers in the Khmer Rouge before defecting to 
the Vietnamese.  Finally, international donors 21
have raised concerns about spending and waste. 
Between 2006 and 2013, the court had total ex-
penditures of US$204.6 million. 
C. Insights from the Phnom Penh Lab 
❖ Cambodia is trapped in a cycle of dependency, 
but foreign aid workers are becoming increasing-
ly unwelcome in Phnom Penh. 
There are currently more than 3,500 NGOs in 
Cambodia, many with headquarters in Phnom 
Penh. This means there is one NGO per every 
10,000 Cambodians, the second-highest number 
of NGOs per capita globally after Rwanda.  One 22
corporate professional interviewed went as far as 
to refer to Phnom Penh as “NGO City.”  
International NGOs provide education and 
healthcare in lieu of governments that are unable 
to offer basic services to large swathes of their 
populations. However, services funded or sub-
sidised by outside money should by no means 
become permanent solutions. Without adequate 
build-operate-transfer (BOT) models in practice in 
Cambodia, there are no incentives for the gov-
ernment (and no opportunities for local business-
es) to replace foreign organisations. 
Cambodian NGOs are often focused on meeting 
the basic needs of the bottom twenty percent of 
the population. As one corporate professional put 
it, “NGOs are only focused on the lower classes. 
 Khatharya Um, ‘Cambodia in 2013: The Winds of Change’, 100–102.18
 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2014 (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2014), 313–14, accessed 22 October 2014, http://www.hrw.org/19
sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf.
 Seth Mydons, ‘A survivor documents Cambodia’s nightmare’, New York times, 4 September 2006, accessed 22 October 2014, http://20
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/04/world/asia/04iht-profile.2691973.html?scp=2&sq=Mydans%20Youk%20Chhang&st=cse.
 Kheang Un, ‘The Khmer Rouge Tribunal: A Politically Compromised Search for Justice’, The Journal of Asian Studies 72 (November 2013), 21
785.
 Helena Domashneva, ‘NGOs in Cambodia: It’s Complicated’, The Diplomat, 3 December 2013, accessed 22 October 2014, http://22
thediplomat.com/2013/12/ngos-in-cambodia-its-complicated/. 
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They only meet basic needs without actually de-
veloping the country.” In order for foreign aid 
organisations to complete their mission and exit, 
it is also necessary that they develop and train a 
generation of Cambodian professionals who can 
grow their country’s economy, man a robust and 
effective government and provide social services 
supported by domestic funds. 
Finally, educated Cambodians increasingly per-
ceive foreign NGO workers as over-stayers who 
are capitalising on donor funding to enjoy a com-
fortable life in Phnom Penh. At the heart of this is 
a clash of cultures between the conservative 
Cambodian establishment and the more free-
wheeling ways of expatriates. Several Cambodi-
ans interviewed complained about the expatriate 
foreign aid workers they had met. The recent 
scandal surrounding the Somaly Mam Foundation 
has not helped the image of NGOs as do-good-
ers either. One government official interviewed 
insisted that the “NGOs need to retire.” 
 
❖ Monitoring and evaluation procedures at-
tached to international grants stifle innovative 
solutions, but they also encourage NGOs to in-
corporate more sustainable practices. 
Much of the aid Cambodians receive from foreign 
donors and their local affiliates does not target 
the root causes of the country’s problems. Dollars 
from international foundations often come with 
strict monitoring and evaluation requirements 
that effectively bar them from being used in ex-
perimental aid programmes. New approaches 
that fail to deliver results could potentially give 
foreign philanthropic foundations reason to pull 
annual funding from an NGO.  
By developing self-sustaining social business 
models, many NGOs are aiming to procure more 
“unrestricted” funds, which can be spent as the 
NGO sees fit. While maintaining their current 
donor funding for tried-and-true programmes, 
several nonprofit organisations interviewed were 
attempting to fund the expansion of experimental 
programmes with self-sustaining social business-
es. Currently, these business elements make up 
less than 50 percent of their budgets. 
❖ Cambodia’s government is working hard to 
reform the country’s education system to produce 
graduates with marketable skill sets, but reform 
will take time. 
The public education system in Cambodia, even 
at its most elite institutions, is currently inade-
quate at preparing its graduates with skills rele-
vant to a professional setting. Education is primar-
ily test-driven and favours rote-learning over cre-
ative thinking, analysis and problem solving skills. 
Bribes are also commonplace, and a diploma is 
by no means an assurance that the student has 
mastered the knowledge tested. As one corpo-
rate professional pointed out, “it’s a past they may 
or may not have paid for.” 
Businesses in Cambodia are often unable to find 
and retain adequately skilled local personnel to 
staff their offices. Although there are 78 indepen-
dent universities in the country, graduates are not 
always equipped with the skills and competencies 
needed for the work place. Most firms expend a 
significant amount of their own resources training 
the employees in-office, even if there is no guar-
antee that new hires will stay with the organisation 
past their initial contract. To avoid costly trainings, 
organisation continue to fill leadership positions 
with foreign talent. Cambodians are still largely 
unable to assume private and social sector lead-
ership positions in their own country. 
Cambodia’s secondary school system shows 
some signs of progress, but these must be tem-
pered with expectations that the problem will not 
be resolved overnight. Hang Chuon Naron, the 
newly appointed Minister for Education, recently 
tightened controls on the high school exit exami-
nation in an attempt to combat widespread 
bribery and cheating. As a result, as many as 70 
percent of students failed the 2014 exam. In spite 
of reform from the top and a strong state-man-
dated curriculum, the unfortunate reality is that 
government teachers do not adequately pre-
pared students for the examination. Due to their 
low salaries, many Cambodian teachers have de-
veloped a practice of not teaching during school 
hours and leaving students to sign up for paid 
tuitions held after school. In order to improve the 
quality of education, commentators have sug-
gested that the Cambodian government adopt a 
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teacher-centric approach, providing salary 
bonuses and additional training. 
❖ Cambodian civil society organisations are in 
need of business management training centred 
on practical experience. 
Although NGOs are increasingly prevalent at all 
levels of Cambodian society, local NGO person-
nel often lack key skill sets. Several leaders inter-
viewed from civil society groups complained that 
NGOs are doing work typically slated for the gov-
ernment, such as providing for educational and 
health facilities, but that the leaders running these 
organisations are often untrained and inexperi-
enced. Interviewee examples of much needed 
training included human resources management, 
financial management, ethical leadership, men-
toring and coaching skills. More emphasis was 
put on management over leadership skills. Ac-
cording to one community leader interviewed, 
“Everyone is talking about leadership, but we 
don’t need leadership skills. We need manage-
ment skills, especially for middle managers.” 
❖ Cambodia’s infrastructure must play catch up 
before the country can become a viable business 
prospect for local entrepreneurs. 
Many young Cambodians educated abroad are 
returning home to launch their own en-
trepreneurial ventures, but they often find them-
selves hamstrung by the absence of basic in-
frastructure in the country. The rural areas espe-
cially lack roads, bridges, irrigation systems and 
electricity grids. When asked about the number 
one challenge to starting a business in Phnom 
Penh, one interviewee replied  succinctly: “Elec-
tricity. Full stop.” 
Interviewees generally felt that rural areas would 
benefit the most from increased infrastructure 
development. Investment in technology and 
learning from others, such as Thai farmers, could 
bolster the agricultural sector and teach Cambo-
dians how to improve yield as well as package 
and distribute their products. 
❖ Compared to the nonprofit sector, the bar for 
business entry seems higher. 
Interviewees from the private sector complained 
about red tape that prevents them from launching 
businesses in Cambodia. Laws governing arbitra-
tion are incomplete, and legal backing is not al-
ways present when disputes arise. According to 
Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index, Cambodia has one of the most cor-
rupt business practice in ASEAN and is rated 160 
out of 175 countries worldwide.  Government 23
agencies monitoring businesses often possess 
faulty governance structures and are involved in 
practices that generate significant conflicts of in-
terest. For instance, most government officials 
involved in regulating the private sector are un-
derpaid and supplement their income by de-
manding bribes and penalties. 
Cambodians recently returned from education 
abroad tend to be the only young people in the 
country who have the confidence to embark on a 
business plan, but there are very few institutions 
that can provide these young entrepreneurs with 
startup capital. Behind the current trend of suc-
cessful cafes and restaurant owners are not banks 
or venture capital funds, but well-resourced fami-
lies flushed with cash from established industries 
such as textiles, tourism and agriculture. It is not 
clear whether these enterprises, such as Brown 
Coffee Co., are even turning a profit. If Cambodia 
is unable to open up the business sector to skilled 
Cambodians eager to found their own business, 
the country could suffer a brain drain in coming 
years as its frustrated young people depart for 
more startup-friendly shores. 
 Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2013), accessed 22 October 2014, http://www.transparency.org/23
cpi2013/results#myAnchor2.
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V. List of Organisations Interviewed 
Anglican Diocese Cambodia. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
Ministry of Health, Kingdom of Cambodia. Phnom Penh, 17 August 2014. 
Chab Dai. Singapore, 4 September 2014. 
Digital Divide Data. Phnom Penh, 19 August 2014. 
Far East Broadcasting Company. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014.  
Friends International. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
Genesis Community. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
Genocide Education Project Documentation Center. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
Goel Community. Phnom Penh, 19 August 2014. 
Himawari Pte Ltd. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
KPMG. Phnom Penh, 19 August 2014. 
Kredit. Singapore, 28 April 2014. 
National Assembly of the Kingdom of Cambodia. Phnom Penh, 17 August 2014.  
New Life Fellowship. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
Population Services International. Phnom Penh, 19 August 2014.  
World Renew. Phnom Penh, 18 August 2014. 
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ORGANISATIONS BY SECTOR
Media & Academia
1Commercial
2
Government
2
SIO
11 SIO SUB-SECTORS
MFIs
1
Social Ent.
3
Nonprofits
7
Total Organisations Interviewed: 16 
SIO: 11 
 Nonprofits: 7 
 Social Enterprises: 3 
 Microcredit Institution (MFI): 1 
Government: 2 
Commercial: 2 
Media & Academia: 1
VI. Questions for Interviewees 
Organisational History  
1) How and why was your organisation established? Is there a founding story? 
2) For international organisations – Why did your organisation decide to enter Cambodia?  
Operations  
3) On what projects are you currently working? What would success look like one year from 
now? Five years from now? 
4) How successful were your past programmes? What is your organisation doing differently 
from when it first began operations in Cambodia? 
5) Do you foresee any upcoming difficulties?  
6) What does your organisation need to make your programmes more effective?  
Strategies  
7) What are your organisation’s goals for the next 3-5 years? How do you plan to meet those 
goals? 
8) What factors might jeopardise the success of your overall strategy?  
Collaboration  
9) Were there any difficulties or pitfalls in past collaborations? Have any difficulties surfaced in 
your current collaborations?  
10) Have you collaborated with organisations outside your sector? How could such rela-
tionships be improved or facilitated?  
11) Is there any individual or organisation with whom you would like to collaborate but have 
been unable to do so?  
Human Resources  
12) Do you generally source staff locally or from overseas? Have you had any difficulties finding 
skilled local staff?  
13) Which professional skills, if any, do local staff currently lack? What do local staff need to 
succeed in today’s workplace?  
14) How would you evaluate local educational institutions in preparing future employees? Are 
there private or foreign institutions attempting to fill any gaps?  
Leadership  
15) What does effective leadership—in business, government or civil society—look like to you? 
16) What skills and resources do Cambodian leaders need to better serve their society?  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17) The Institute broadly defines societal leadership as “the practice of creating sustainable 
value and impact for the betterment of society within one’s sphere of influence.” Are there 
any remarkable individuals in Cambodia whom you would consider a societal leader? 
Sustainability & CSR 
18) Does you organisation have any sustainability guidelines? How did you determine your 
current guidelines? 
19) Does your organisation engage in any Corporate Social Responsibility  (CSR) initiatives? 
Have you been able to measure the impact of your organisation’s CSR programmes? 
Funding (for civic-sector organisations) 
20) Roughly speaking, how is your organisation currently funded?  
21) How financially self-sustaining is your organisation at the moment? Do you have any plans 
to lower dependence on outside funding in the future? 
Context  
22) How does working in Cambodia differ from working in other Southeast Asian countries? 
What does Cambodia have in common with the rest of the region?  
23) How do minorities (ethnic, religious, or otherwise) fit into the landscape? Do minorities 
actively collaborate with the status quo?  
24) Outside of your own organisation’s scope, what are the key problem areas facing Cam-
bodia?  
25) How is Cambodia different from five years ago? How do you imagine it will change in the 
next five years?  
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